HiLL PUBLISHING

Journal of Literature Advances, 2024, 1(1), 24-35
https://www.hillpublisher.com/Journals/jla/
ISSN Online:
ISSN Print:

Philosophical Education During the Almohad Rule/Ibn Rushd

Ilham Ibnouzahir

Faculty of Sciences Ben M'sik, University of Hassan II Casablanca, Casablanca 21100, Morocco.

How to cite this paper: Ilham Ibnouzahir. (2024). Philosophical Education During the Almohad Rule/Ibn Rushd. *Journal of Literature Advances*, 1(1), 24-35.
DOI: 10.26855/jla.2024.12.003

Received: September 6, 2024
Accepted: September 29, 2024
Published: October 23, 2024

***Corresponding author:** Ilham Ibnouzahir, Faculty of Sciences Ben M'sik, University of Hassan II Casablanca, Casablanca 21100, Morocco.

Abstract

During the twelfth century the Almohads established themselves as a powerful and immensely feared Berber-Muslim Caliphate. They started by procuring religious and political mastery of the Berbers in the Atlas Mountains, south of Morocco only to extend their power to include neighbouring Mediterranean countries in North Africa adding to their strength south of Spain, Andalusia. Though the Almohads were greatly apprehended due to their radical determination to brutally eliminate their enemies, Muslims as well as Christians, their founder, Ibn Tumart, surprisingly strongly advised reliance on rational thinking to understand Islam. However, while Ibn Tumart's call for reason can be questionable, later successors were better disposed towards reflective thinking and even paved the way for the integration of philosophy as an openly accepted and admired Greek discipline. This study will delve into the philosophical ideas of Ibn Rushd, a prominent philosopher and a close associate of the second and third caliphs. His contributions were pivotal in reinforcing philosophy as an essential discipline, enriching the theological discourse and fostering a more critical and robust intellectual environment.

Keywords

History; education; philosophy; theology; jurisprudence; assent

Introduction

Historically speaking, in medieval Islamic civilization, philosophy (*falsafa*) was at its height encompassing all scientific as well as metaphysical subjects: topics included mathematics (Euclidean geometry, Ptolemy), astronomy, natural science and medicine (Hippocrates, Galen), to name only a few. The prosperity of philosophy and of learning in general was the result of the Abbassid late eighth century colossal project which centred on a vast translation movement. Ancient philosophical and scientific texts were translated from Greek into Syriac and then into Arabic. Indeed, Arabic became quintessentially the language of scientific learning and philosophy. Within this institutionalised and successful project, being a philosopher meant having knowledge in these leading subjects as well as in reading and understanding Arabic.[1] The beneficial outcome of the translation movement was seen in the fact that knowledge was shared between the East and the Islamic West: manuscripts were sent from one part of the world to the other, they were copied and traded with extreme care given their priceless intellectual worth. The Islamic philosophical tradition, which began in the East, was significantly shaped by the pioneering works of al-kindi (801-873), al-Farabi (872-950) and Ibn Sina (980-1037), who integrated and expanded upon the philosophical heritage of Ancient Greece. They were the first major thinkers to have creatively preserved and extended peripatetic and

[1] For example, Maimonides, the outstanding medieval Jewish philosopher, composed some of his writings in Arabic using Hebrew letters. This testifies to the fact that to be widely read and intellectually acknowledged, an author had to learn and write in Arabic regardless of their religious and cultural background.

Neoplatonic philosophical work of the Ancient Greek authors, mainly, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and Proclus. Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina's respective work provided an essential basis for all subsequent Muslim philosophers be it in the East or in the West.

In Northern Africa and Muslim Spain, Andalusia, learning science and philosophy were focused mainly on mathematics, medicine and Islamic Law–jurisprudence. One of the earliest representatives of this Greco-Islamic/Arabic tradition was Ibn Bajjah, better known by his Latinised name, Avempace (1095-1138). Ibn Bajjah was the first Andalusian author to have found inspiration in Platonic and Aristotelian views of philosophy more than he did in religious canonical texts of Malikite scholars.[2] He was a polymath living in the Almoravids period. He was educated in several substantial subjects, such as, mathematics, astronomy, physics, medicine and philosophy. His most famous work, *Regimen of the Solitary*, deals with metaphysical ideas and presents a sharp critique of political governance. In this work Ibn Bajjah has voiced his strong disapproval of the ethical and political corruption which he believes was widespread among his contemporaries. It is for this reason that he "focuses not on the perfect prophet and philosopher-ruler of al-Farabi's theory, but on the isolated philosopher living amidst a morally bankrupt population»[3], as Adamson observes. For Ibn Bajjah, the only way not to be subjugated to social and political corruption is to lead a wisely governed philosophical life, one which can be achieved by improving one's capacity to reach intellectual ascent towards the Divine. Unfortunately, even though Ibn Bajjah was a distinguished philosopher and also vizir of the Almoravid ruler, Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, he did not escape vehement hostility and malevolent scheming of other senior servants; he was imprisoned twice and eventually was poisoned and died in Fez.

The present work is an attempt to provide a critical analysis of the Almohad's historical and cultural importance. It is divided into two parts: the first part will examine the historical and cultural background of the Almohad Caliphate, starting first with a synopsis of their predecessors, the Almoravids. The historical and cultural background of the Almohads, as exemplified by their founder Ibn Tumart and his successor, Abd al-Mumin, is marked by a strong religious and political message. Their educational intentions were aimed at the Berber community in the Atlas Mountains, with ambitions that extended well beyond this region. The second part portrays another facet to the Almohad's political and educational scheme by introducing the philosophical ideas of Ibn Rushd and by showing the way in which they are endorsed by the second and third caliphs, Abu Ya'qub Yusuf and his son, Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-Mansur.[4] Both rulers greatly admired Ibn Rushd's sharp mind and judgement and both engaged with learning philosophically rather than doctrinally, thus marking a sharp break with their predecessors.

1. Historical and Cultural Background of the Almohad Caliphate

Historically, the early eleventh century marked the dissolution of Umayyad power in Spain, leading to a period of political fragmentation characterised by competing party-kings ruling over various city-states. The princes/kings "battled against one another and formed alliances, sometimes even with Christian states and sometimes to the point of becoming mere tributaries of Christian kings."[5] As a result, unceasing internal struggles prevailed and civil wars encouraged Alphonso VI of Leon and Castile to launch constant attacks attempting to reconquer the south of Spain. Nevertheless, his attempts failed since the petty kings, realising their political fragility, appealed to the Almoravid ruler, Yusuf ibn Tashfin (reigned 1061-1106) who entered Spain at their common official invitation for the purpose of restoring their sovereign authority. Ibn Tashfin succeeded in defeating Alphonso at the battle of Zallaqah in 1086 only to return again a couple of years later for the same initial cause, namely to help Muslim kings resist the northern Christian rulers' increased confidence and power. Furthermore, as Watt and Cachia pertinently remarked, "Yusuf and his captains for their part had tasted something of the luxury of al-Andalus, and were probably not loth to return. In addition, they believed that they were promoting the cause of Islam by fighting against the enemies."[6] Indeed, between 1090 and 1091, the Almoravids decided to remove the Umayyads from power and to replace them by uniting all the small kingdoms under their own rule. Therefore, Andalusia became part of the Almoravid empire which already stretched over the Western Maghrib.

In their origins, the Almoravids were Berber nomads coming from the desert in Morocco. These Berbers were skilled warriors who had ardently learnt the fundamentals of Islam and the importance of being one political force

[2] An explanatory reference will be given shortly.
[3] Peter Adamson, *Philosophy in the Islamic World: A History without any gaps*, vol. 3 (Oxford University Press, 2016) 173.
[4] Since the names of these two caliphs are so close, from now on reference to the father will be ***Yusuf*** and his son, ***al-Mansur***.
[5] Ronald A. Messier, *The Almoravids and the Meanings of Jihad* (Praeger, California, 2010) 71.
[6] W. Montgomery Watt and Pierre Cachia, *A History of Islamic Spain* (Edinburgh University Press, 1996), 98.

guided by the teachings of their reformer and commander, Abdallah ibn Yasin (d.1059). With his unfaltering dedication to the teachings and strict practice of Islam, Ibn Yasin had an enormous impact on his successors who were equally religious and faithful to their leader and, more strongly, to the Malikite School of law.[7] Yusuf ibn Tashfin was one of a series of successful commanders taking the lead after Ibn Yassin's death. He was a brilliant and shrewd militant and was later succeeded by his son, Ali ben Yousef and then the latter's son, Tashfin ben Ali.[8] Ibn Tashfin and his sons had all respectively ruled both in Morocco, with Marrakech as their capital, and in the Iberian Peninsula. Although they showed interest in culture and philosophy, the latter was severely curtailed due to the theologians' deeply-rooted influence both on Muslims and their leaders.

Indeed, the ideology of the Sunni school was deeply ingrained into the Almoravid's rule and became their defining identity. This yielding to the Malikite meant that the rulers rejected "ideas irreconcilable with its teaching. As custodians of religious legitimacy, they therefore considered contradicting the Malikite position on points of Islamic law or theological questions as amounting to questioning the legitimacy of the entire Almoravid religio-political system."[9] Such convictions merely reveal the passive union in which the Almoravids are caught. And as a consequence of rulers being ruled and cut off their freedom to judge partially there is the disturbing example of Ibn Bajjah, mentioned above. In fact, the guardians of religion equally saw to it that the manuscripts of the Eastern philosopher, al-Ghazali (1058-1111), were burnt in public, as a strong reminder of their power to interfere in every field of life: religious, social, intellectual, and more crucially, political. Nevertheless, despite the malikite rigid endorsement, the Almoravids were soon challenged by the Almohads and their empire came to an end in 1147 in Marrakech.

Like the Almoravids, the Almohad movement was initiated by the religious Berber reformer Mohammad Ibn Tumart (1077-1130), who sought to challenge the prevailing Malikite orthodoxy and introduce a new interpretation of Islamic principles, significantly influencing the political and religious dynamics of the time. In his youth Ibn Tumart had a strong urge and passion for religious knowledge and *shari'a*[10] education, therefore, as a student looking for an unfaltering training in this field he travelled to the Middle East where he allegedly met the prominent sufi-religious scholar, al-Ghazali and was immensely inspired by his masterpiece work, *The Revival of the Religious Sciences*. Additionally, while pursuing his studies, Ibn Tumart came under the influence of several religious schools, namely the Ash'arite, Mu'tazila and Kharijjite. Such an influence, however, was not received passively since Ibn Tumart was merely preparing and developing his own vision of Islam. Once he returned to Morocco he put his synthesised ideas in his own written book, called *Kitab A'azz ma Yutlab*, or *The Greatest of what is sought.*[11] Fromherz appropriately summarises Ibn Tumart's perspective as follows:

> *Like the writings of most religious revolutionaries, Ibn Tumart's book challenged the status quo and did not fit easily into a previously existing school or category of Islam. It was difficult to determine whether his ideas were influenced by al-Ghazali of the East, the Malikis of the West, the philosophical Mu'tazila or literalist Ash'ari, the Shi'ite or even the radical Kharijites.*[12]

In point of fact, Ibn Tumart was particularly opposed to Malikism which had become an accepted legal system strictly on the grounds of their gathered commentaries on the Qur'an and Hadith (the prophet Mohamad's sayings and deeds). Such commentaries were later compiled in a legal code, named *Mudawana* (or code of law), faithfully relied upon by a great majority of the Muslim community. Furthermore, what Ibn Tumart finds most disconcerting is malikite's literal interpretation of some verses of the Qur'an which make reference to God's hand, face, hearing and sitting on a throne. Other theologians as well as Ibn Tumart reject this assumption of attributing human

[7] *Maliki school of law attributed to Malik ibn Anas al-Asbahi in the eighth century in the Arabian Peninsula … Characterized by strong emphasis on Hadith; many doctrines are attributed to early Muslims such as Muhammad's wives, relatives, and Companions.* See John L. Esposto, *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam* (Oxford, 2003). NB. The terms 'Malikite' and 'Maliki' refer to the same school of law. It is simply that historians differ in writing the same word depending on the origin of their country.

[8] Ali ben Yusuf reigned from 1106 till 1143. He was the main figure fighting against Ibn Tumart and his successor, Abd al-Mumin. Tashfin Ibn Ali reigned for a very short period, from 1143 until 1145. Soon after his death, his son, Tashfin Ibn Ali, was proclaimed king but due to his young age his uncle took the lead only to be killed, both himself and his small nephew, by the Almohads. Hence bringing the final end of the Almoravid dynasty in 1147. See, R. A. Messier, Ibid. P. Guichard, *Al-Andalus 711-1492 Une Histoire de L'Espagne Musulmane* (Fayard/Pluriel, 2010). R. Fletcher, *Moorish Spain* (University of California Press, 1992).

[9] Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, 1987), 88.

[10] Islamic law and jurisprudence.

[11] Ibn Tumart, *Kitab A'azz ma Yutlab* (*Le Livre de Ibn Tumart*), edited by I. Goldziher, (Algiers,1903).

[12] Allen J. Fromherz, *The Almohads, The Rise of an Islamic Empire* (London, 2013) p. 155.

characteristics to God and unequivocally condemn the Malikite's anthropomorphism.[13] Henceforth, Ibn Tumart vehemently criticised the fact that the Almoravids "had enslaved themselves to the legal rulings of Maliki school of jurisprudence."[14] For him, they had in fact missed the true faith and were as a result unfit to govern and to unite people under a scrupulous conception of God. It is on the basis of this conviction and understanding that Ibn Tumart's ideological and political theory emerged. He saw himself as a religious and a political reformer and true educator as opposed to the Almoravid Emir, Ali ben Yusuf, who could neither free his rule from the powerful Malikite scholars nor was he able to teach the doctrine of *tawhid*, i.e., assertion of the unity of God. This shows that Ibn Tumart's religious ambition to bring reform was going hand in hand with his political dream and fervour which did not merely amount to rule with a new programme but also to present himself as the expected Mehdi, the awaited last Muslim prophet.

The question that begs itself is, in what did Ibn Tumart's religious and political reform consist? And equally important to find out is the basis on which Ibn Tumart claimed to be a prophet, the last one? Ibn Tumart established himself firmly in the High Atlas in Morocco where he acted as the supreme head of the community in Tinmal. He was adamant on teaching the true meaning of Islam in a simple way that would reach and speak to every ordinary Muslim; he despised the Malikite sophisticated and exclusive teaching. For that purpose, he was assisted by three purposefully hierarchical sets of councils and young students, called *Huffaz and tullab*.[15] The first council was made up of ten close followers, including Abd al-Mumin (c. 1094-1163), his most trusted and faithful disciple who would later succeed him; the second and the third consisted each of fifty and seventy assistants. The councils' respective role was to show genuine and uncompromising endorsement of Ibn Tumart's religious and political ideas and to ensure that the group of *tullab* and *huffaz* help maintain discipline and obedience to the teachings of their leader.[16] They could do so by reporting misconduct, such as missing Friday noon prayer[17] or not fully memorising Ibn Tumart's deliberately simplified religious and moral rules set in his book, *The Greatest of what is sought*. Error and forgetting were neither allowed nor tolerated by Ibn Tumart.

This intolerance is fuelled by Ibn Tumart's persuasion that he was the last prophet divinely inspired to teach a fundamentally new conception of Islam which, to his mind, had to be strictly followed. To announce his alleged right to prophecy, he gathered followers, stood under a tree and delivered a speech formally and firmly stating that he was "chosen to save Islam from internal and external enemies."[18] The words "internal and external" are significant and were meant concretely by the inspired leader. Indeed, in contradistinction with his claim to gather tribes under the unity of God and under the title, *al-Mouahhidun* -those who affirm God's unicity- Ibn Tumart and his closest disciple, Abd al-mumin, actually had thousands of their fellow tribesmen killed in a voluntary purge for daring to question the authority of Ibn Tumart as their leader and prophet.[19] Those who fail the test of daily reciting -out of memory- Ibn Tumart's doctrine were severely punished and whipped.[20] Such events and iniquitous conduct disguised under the controversial pretence to restore a basic teachings of Islam, to avoid the bad and to do good mark a dark twist in the Almohad's method of ruling and educating Berber Muslims in their proper faith.

What is more paradoxical in Ibn Tumart's reform lies in urging every disciple to preoccupy themselves with "understanding tawhid, for this is the base of your religion."[21] Yet, it is this individual endeavour to *occupy oneself with understanding tawhid* which is controversial. According to Geoffroy, Ibn Tumart aims to nurture a new elite, the tullab and huffaz, and to offer them an intellectual religious training under his close supervision so that eventually this trained youth will replace older authoritative figures.[22] However, Geoffroy and other historians have overlooked the fact that these tullab and huffaz are merely forced to imagine they are learning to think for themselves when in reality they are reproducing their leader's exclusive rendering of the sacred text and the prophet's utterances. Not only are they commanded to carry out orders rather than using their own reasoning, they are also charged with forcing

[13] A. J. Fromherz, ibid. 161-162.
[14] Michael Brett and Elizabeth Fentress, *The Berbers* (Blackwell, 1998) 109.
[15] *Huffaz* means those who memorise religious texts. *Tullab* is the plural of *talib* meaning student and a seeker of (religious) knowledge.
[16] A. J. Fromherz, ibid. 126-127.
[17] As Amira K. Bennison clearly explains, « Every male Muslim was (is) required to attend the communal noon prayer on Friday as a religious duty. » See her book, The Great Caliphs: The Golden Age of the 'Abbasid Empire (I.B. Tauris, 2011) 82. Friday noon prayer is held "in the mosque and performed in straight lines, with men in front and women and children either behind or in a separate area. The khutba (sermon) is a feature particular to the Friday service. See *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, ibid. 276.
[18] A. J. Fromherz, 59.
[19] Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge University Press, 1993) 89-90.
[20] Dominique Urvoy, Averroes: Les Ambitions d'un intellectuel musulman (Flammarion, 1998) 56-57.
[21] E. Lévi-Provençal, (ed.) Documents inédits d'histoire Almohade (Paris, 1928) 7.
[22] Marc Geoffroy, '*Ibn Tumart et l'idéologie Almohade'* in *Averroès: Le livre du discours décisif* (Flammarion, Paris, 1996) 87-96.

illiterate fellow tribesman to recite Ibn Tumart's writing faultlessly. To sum up Ibn Tumart's idea of a revolutionary religious reform, it can be maintained that even though he rejected all established theological schools promising the independent use of reason he ended up forbidding this particular intellectual practice.

Politically, before fulfilling his ambition to outset the Almoravids, Ibn Tumart died in 1130 and three years later, Abd al-Mumin was selected as his successor. Being more determined in politics than his mentor, he succeeded in finally conquering Marrakesh in 1147. Keeping the founding structure of tullab and huffaz laid out by Ibn Tumart, Abd al-Mumin altered their course by adding a rigorous physical training programme on top of their previously assigned functions. Abd al-mumin "set up a school at Marrakech to create a more uniform corps of bureaucrats. Even so, he maintained the doctrine of the Mahdi."[23] In other words, they had to be educated mentally by memorising the founder's works as well as studying other theological texts. Physically, they followed a strict regimen learning swimming, athletism, horse riding and archery.[24]

Not surprisingly, Abd al-Mumin went even further proclaiming himself to be a caliph, one who is totally independent from the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad. Howeve, even though "Abd al-Mumin never declared any intention to conquer the rest of the Muslim world or challenge the Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad"[25], as Kennedy holds, his declaration was a bold statement declaring that, as far as he was concerned, the expected allegiance to the Abbasid caliphate in the Middle East was neither required nor acknowledged by him. His goal was limited to creating a prosperous and thriving caliphate ruling over all of North Africa as well as the Muslim Iberian Peninsula. Therefore, while Marrakech was the Almohads' capital in North Africa, in southern Spain it was Seville, two sites famous for cherishing learning and intellectual thriving.

Before reaching Andalusia, Abd al-Mumin died in battle in Portugal and it was his son Abu Yaqub Yusuf, already governor of Seville for seven years, who took power and settled his government between Seville and Marrakech. In fact, as Kennedy maintains, the founder of the Almohad, "Ibn Tumart seems to have had no sons and his brothers were systematically removed from any positions of responsibility and influence. It was the family of Abd al-Mumin who were to provide the caliphs until the end of the Almohad regime."[26] Indeed, after the leadership of Abd al-Mumin it was his progenitors who sustained power until 1269. However, compared to his father and to Ibn Tumart, the second caliph, Abu Yaqub Yusuf, was less drawn by a severe sense of religiosity and merciless persecution of members of the community and was more sensitive to learning in general and philosophy in particular. Ambiguously, Yusuf neither denied nor madly furthered his earlier training in Almohad doctrine but he was manifestly looking for a new and more authentic knowledge.

To attain that goal, he held frequent cultural meetings with erudite men of Letters, best of all was Ibn Tufayl (1110-1185) who was a highly cultured philosopher and a court physician. He wrote an influential philosophical novel, called *Hayy ibn Yaqzan – Living, Son of Awake*.[27] This text delineates the idea that a careful philosophical pondering on the surrounding world will indubitably lead to belief in God and to universal knowledge without assistance from religious authorities and intermediaries. Ibn Tufayl was Ibn Rushd's mentor and friend. He had such a high esteem for his intellectual strength that he made sure to introduce him to the caliph, Yusuf. By such an act he was the initiator of a long-lasting friendship between Yusuf and Ibn Rushd. To give a rounded picture of the idea of being educated in philosophy during the Almohad rule, it is necessary at this point to include the thoughts of Ibn Rushd and to find out how significant these disciplines are for him, since he is considered the most important philosopher and jurist in the twelfth century.

2. Ibn Rushd (1126-1198): Is It Permitted to Learn Philosophy?

Ibn Rushd is a Muslim philosopher, an eminent judge and a thoughtful jurist. His full name is abu'l-Walid Muhammad Ibn Ahmad ibn Rushd. His ideas are embedded in the cultural and historical background of his time whose predominant school of law was Maliki, as stated above. Ibn Rushd made important contributions practising and writing on jurisprudence, medicine and philosophy. Having received a thorough education in jurisprudence and being the son and grandson of very famous judges, Ibn Rushd soon became himself an able judge and jurist. He was judge of Seville in 1169 and in 1171 he was deservedly appointed chief judge of Cordoba. *Bidayat al-mujtahid wa nihayat al-*

[23] A. J. Fromherz, 127.
[24] M. Geoffroy, 95.
[25] Hugh Kennedy, *The Caliphate* (Pelican Books, UK, 2016) 322.
[26] Hugh Kennedy, 319.
[27] Lenn E. Goodman (tans.), Ibn Tufayl: Hay ibnYaqzan (Chicago, IL, 2009).

muqtasid, which can be translated as: "Beginning for whoever makes a Personal Effort and an End for whoever is Contented" is considered one of his major legal texts. This work, written around 1168, is a rational study of Shari'a (Islamic law) where Ibn Rushd, as Urvoy explains, is "considering at each point solutions proposed by small schools or significant individuals and not only by the major schools of interpretation."[28] For Ibn Rushd, differences between various religious views had to be highlighted in order to be acknowledged and taken into account. Therefore, for him this is a purposeful method in itself aiming at meditating on the controversial principles which give rise to differences. On the other hand, and as far as medicine is concerned, Ibn Rushd wrote *Kitab al-Kulliyat fi Tibb* – or *Generalities on Medicine,* a book which encompasses several summaries and commentaries on Ibn Sina's medical oeuvre, *The Canon* as well as other commentaries on Galenic medical knowledge. This work became essential for newly qualified doctors serving as a valuable instrument both in theory and in practice. In 1182 when Ibn Tufayl could no longer perform his duties due to old age, Ibn Rushd replaced him and became a successful court physician.

With regards to philosophy, given Ibn Rushd's substantial knowledge of Aristotle, the caliph Yusuf commissioned him to write a commentary on this Ancient Greek master in order to make his philosophy and scientific queries more accessible to read and to fathom. Ibn Rushd responded eagerly to the caliph's request composing not only one standard commentary but rather three types of commentaries: short, middle and long each respectively providing paraphrases of Aristotle's texts either in a general manner or following Aristotle's texts and ideas point by point. This painstaking endeavour earned Ibn Rushd the title of « The Commentator », for it was thanks to his singular work that medieval European scholars made the astounding discovery of Aristotle's colossal philosophical work. Besides his legal and medical texts as well as the commentaries, Ibn Rushd also wrote other important books in philosophy. First, in response to al-Ghazali's, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* where he passionately attempts to refute ancient Greek philosophy – as understood and practised by al-Farabi and especially Ibn Sina -, Ibn Rushd wrote a lengthy book entitled, *The Incoherence of Incoherence*. Here Ibn Rushd minutely deals with al-Ghazali's arguments one by one, seeking to defend philosophy and to free it from unfounded prejudices. Second, around 1180 and in the same vein of defending philosophy against al-Ghazali and all other more conservative theologians, Ibn Rushd produced an estimable work entitled, *Fasl al-Maqal wa taqrir ma bayn al-shari'a wa al-hikma min al-ittisal*, translated as *The Book of the Decisive Treatise, determining the Connection between the Law and Wisdom*.[29] Unlike the eighth century theological school, the *Mutazilites*, who prioritised reason and human free will, the tenth and eleventh century religious scholars, *Malikis*, the *Hanbalites* and the *Asharites*, warned that philosophical reasoning disrupts the teachings of Islam, does not comply with the canonical theological views and leads to loss of faith.[30] On this account, Maliki spokesmen in Andalusia, the official and powerful school of law there, rejected and even banned doing philosophy. Nevertheless, being an equally authoritative figure not merely in one but in three determining domains: as chief-jurist, court physician and philosopher, Ibn Rushd resolved to resist this ban simply by bringing to light the reasons for this rejection of philosophy and wondering whether they are justifiable or whether they are themselves objectionable. Yet, more vehemently, Ibn Rushd defends philosophy by invoking both its historical past and by referring to the caliph Yusuf for his necessary support.

Unfortunately, although scholars of medieval philosophy have acknowledged Ibn Rushd as "the greatest Islamic philosopher in the west of the Islamic world"[31] and stated that he strove "to reconcile religion and philosophy in the Spain of his day",[32] their studies remain insufficient insofar as Ibn Rushd's philosophical vision is not fully taken into account. The ban of philosophy shows that the treatise is composed in the midst of a cultural crisis in which

[28] Dominique Urvoy, « *Ibn Rushd* » in S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman (eds.), *History of Islamic Philosophy*, 2 vols. (London, 1996) See Part I.

[29] Ibn Rushd, *The Book of the Decisive Treatise, Determining the Connection between the Law and Wisdom* in *Averroës Decisive Treatise and Epistle Dedicatory*, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (USA: Brigham Young University Press, 2001).

[30] The term « Mutazilites » is an Arabic word which means 'Separatists': Being the pioneers in using Greek philosophy, the Mutazilites theologians are so called because they willingly broke away from traditional *kalam*. The latter is another Arabic term which connotes theological debates and confrontational conversations on major issues, such as, the proofs for the existence of God, fate, good, evil, the relationship between reason and revelation. Followers of Kalam, called, *almutakallimun*, believed that man's reason by itself is not sufficient to reach definite conclusions regarding theological queries. By contrast, the Mutazilites had much more faith in man's use of reason to discern between ethical questions and to ponder on ontological and cosmological issues. Hanbalites school of Law, on the other hand, emphasised the authority of Hadith and was suspicious of speculative reasoning on Islamic Law. As for the Asharites, they maintained that human reasoning and judgement are bound to err, therefore, distinction between moral issues ought to aquire a legal status. In other words, what the shari'a/Islamic Law commands must be good and what it forbids must be forbidden: all human acts, according to this view, are determined and governed by God. See, Mohmmad Hashim Kamal, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence* (The Islamic Text Society, Cambridge, UK, 1991) 343; Ziauddin Sadar and Zafar Abbas Malik, *Introducing Mohammad* (Icon Books, UK, 1999) 89; *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, ibid.

[31] Oliver Leaman, *A Brief Introduction to Philosophy* (Cambridge: UK, 1999) 7.

[32] Amira K. Bennison, *The Great Caliphs, the Golden Age of the 'Abbasid Empire* (London, 2011) 201.

philosophy, contrary to mathematics, astronomy, medicine and other secular sciences, is impeded and unwelcome. However, by means of his treatise, Ibn Rushd seeks to achieve a reasoned and a peaceful dialogue, one whose narrative includes theologians' different views and complaints. The treatise is fairly short and is written in the form of separate inter-related paragraphs. Ibn Rushd focuses on at least two important points, namely the necessary conditions to embark on a study of philosophy and Shari'a law, jurisprudence. And, secondly, the intellectual legitimacy for any individual to interpret the Sacred text in order to articulate the core of its meaning and eventually to teach it. Yet, prior to dealing with these questions, Ibn Rushd provides a general definition of what philosophy stands for and what verses from the Qur'an may broaden and enhance his definition.

Therefore, at the outset of his text, Ibn Rushd explains that the purpose of this work is "to investigate, from the perspective of law-based reflection, whether reflection upon philosophy and the sciences of logic is permitted, prohibited or commanded – and this as a recommendation or as an obligation – by the Law."[33] By specifically clarifying the basic structure of his text, that it is *"law-based reflection"*, Ibn Rushd is equally drawing attention to his own position, namely that this is a chief jurist speaking and thinking in a written form: a form that will reach the reading public at large.[34] To elaborate, any jurist having to give his legal judgement on a particular religious matter, a judgement interpreting and confirming God's own judgement, must standardly decide whether by law (Islamic law) the issue at hand is allowed, totally forbidden, commanded insofar as it is encouraged or obligatory.[35] And since Ibn Rushd is the legal representative of the ruling califate, he is expected to give his wise and irrevocable judgement on theological queries as well as settle any confusions related to ethical issues. As philosophy is one of the issues that has attracted most debates and objections, Ibn Rushd has made it his own project - more than merely his allocated job - to determine whether the religious scholars' conviction that philosophy must be repudiated is to be upheld or overruled. This gives the impression that philosophy is put on trial and its status must seriously be ruled for or ruled against by Law.

While still at the beginning of his treatise Ibn Rushd quotes several Qur'anic verses such as, "Consider, you who have sight" (59:2), "Have they not reflected upon the kingdoms of the heavens and the earth and what things God has created?" (7:185) and "Do they not reflect upon the camels, how they have been created, and upon the heaven, how it has been raised up?" (88:17). His goal is to supply Qur'anic evidence pointing out to the necessity and injunction to use one's intellectual insight to fathom the world, learn about its mysterious art and get closer to knowing its Creator. For Ibn Rushd, since the Qur'an strongly calls for intellectual reasoning, therefore it goes without saying that it is not opposed to philosophical meditation either. In the second paragraph of the treatise, he pushes his point further, defining what philosophy actually stands for. He wonders,

> *If the activity of philosophy is nothing more than reflection upon existing things and consideration of them insofar as they are an indication of the Artisan – I mean, insofar as they are artifacts, for existing things indicate the Artisan only through cognizance of the art in them, and the more complete cognizance of the art in them, the more complete is cognizance of the Artisan – and if the Law has recommended and urged consideration of existing things, then it is evident that what this name indicates is either obligatory or recommended by the Law.*[36]

Ibn Rushd's narrative gesture beginning with his initial declaration, namely *to investigate* the legal status of philosophy, followed by the cited Qur'anic verses and his above inference that "this name", i.e., philosophy, is "either obligatory or recommended by the Law" is immediately followed by two more vigorous and courageous inferences. Ibn Rushd cogitates,

> *Since it has been determined that the Law makes it obligatory to reflect upon existing things by means of the intellect, and to consider them; and consideration is nothing more than inferring and drawing out the unknown from the known; and this is syllogistic reasoning … therefore, it is obligatory that we go about reflecting upon the existing things by means of intellectual syllogistic reasoning. And it is evident that this manner of reflection the Law calls for and urges is the most complete kind of reflection by means of the*

[33] Ibn Rushd, *Decisive Treatise & Epistle Dedicatory*, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Brigham Young University Press: Provo, 2008) 1. Hitherto the treatise will be referred to as *DT* followed by the page number according to Butterworth's translation.
[34] The reason why Ibn Rushd's statement is significant will be shown in the coming sections.
[35] See Mohammad Hachim Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence* (Cambridge: UK, 1991); W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology, an Extended Survey* (University Press, Edinburgh, 1985).
[36] DT. 1.

most complete kind of syllogistic reasoning and is the one called "demonstration".[37]

The two deductions stated in this quotation are Ibn Rushd's decisive confirmation that in terms of acquiring apodeictic knowledge of God and beings, the law clearly states that "intellectual syllogistic reasoning" is the best way forward. On the other hand, Ibn Rushd is persuaded that both the Sacred book and the world must be read and comprehended demonstratively, that is to say philosophically and logically. In other words, what the law has highlighted and made compulsory is philosophical thinking and logical inferences attained by irrefutable proofs. This demonstrates that Ibn Rushd was a jurist for whom philosophical and religious concerns were vital as the Creator and the world surrounding beings can only make sense if and only if they are reflected upon philosophically and not considered an alien and exterior object.

More strongly, Ibn Rushd adds that should theologians stand against this intellectual activity they will be standing against the Word and injunction of God. In their analysis of the *Decisive Treatise,* scholars tend to miss Ibn Rushd's insight in these opening explosive statements. For instance, Watt is contented to write that "(i)n this essay Averroes bases the discussion on the principles that philosophy is true and that the revealed scriptures are true, and that there cannot therefore be any disharmony between them."[38] And for Ivry, the treatise is "a dogmatic assertion of the superiority of scientific, i.e. demonstrative, philosophical discourse, to all other forms of reasoning. Averroes could scarcely expect to persuade his critics of the virtues of philosophy in this manner, and his writing simply attests to his complete conviction and self-confidence."[39] What many authors have neglected is the fact that Ibn Rushd did not dwell on his initial questionings regarding the legal status of philosophy, rather, as a chief jurist he has swiftly spoken out his "fatwa" -his legal opinion and judgement- and has settled the matter in the first introductory paragraphs. The fatwa proclaims that philosophy ought to be practised and demonstrative reasoning must be learnt. However, since the controversy is completely solved from the start, shouldn't his conclusive announcements bring the treatise to an end? Indeed, Ibn Rushd's approach is surely atypical yet it is not as Watt uncritically contends or as Ivry maintains. More than acting out of 'conviction and self-confidence', Ibn Rushd has a broader idea to argue for and to explore.

On the other hand, Adamson argues that Ibn Rushd "has not even attempted to give a philosophical defense of philosophy. Rather he has appealed to the Koran, as his fellow jurists would expect."[40] Although Adamson's remarks are pertinent, they do not explain Ibn Rushd's hurried conclusion uttered right at the start. In fact, relying on Qur'anic verses is predictable since Ibn Rushd endeavours to question the predominant authority of the religious scholars whose aim is to silence philosophy; he had no alternative but to argue from the perspective of law as presumed by these doctors. Indeed, the latter do see themselves as the true and unique guardians of the Muslim community whose members were expected to follow wholeheartedly their sayings and advice on how best to pursue and maintain their faith. More importantly, Ibn Rushd tries to remind these theologians that, contrary to their belief that doing philosophy leads astray, Muslims have actually always made use of their reasoning in the early debates over religion itself, succession of the prophet after his death in 632 and the meaning of Hadith (the prophet's sayings). In other words, as Ibn Rushd argues, reasoning and attempting to comprehend crucial matters in Islam is not a new and suspicious undertaking. Even a doctor of Law while learning jurisprudence has to master legal reasoning in order to achieve lucidity in his thinking and judgement. And yet, Ibn Rushd insists, he is not considered heretical or being led astray. Arguably, what is at stake in beginning with a precipitated conclusion is Ibn Rushd's endeavour to problematise both the idea of doing philosophy and also the attempt to interpret and teach the Sacred text. Moreover, Ibn Rushd intensifies his opening passages by evoking the importance and usefulness to go back to the ancient Greek philosophers, mainly Aristotle, the master of *intellectual syllogistic reasoning in the most complete manner.*[41] Ibn Rushd's insistence on the necessity *to seize the ancient Greek books in one's hands and reflect upon their wisdom*[42] shows that on the one hand, he values the historical background of philosophical and scientific ideas, in the sense that searching for truth and realising different scientific discoveries can neither entirely emerge from one particular geographical place nor can it be exclusively tied to a specific culture or religion.[43] Rather, this kind of knowledge, as Ibn Rushd points out, has to be related to a wider historical past, thus giving birth to a scientific community whose members belong to

[37] DT. 2-3.
[38] W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (Edinburgh, 1985) 118.
[39] Alfred L. Ivry, « Averroes », in John Marenbon, ed., *Medieval Philosophy: Routledge History of Medieval Philosophy vol.3* (London: Routledge, 1998) 49-64.
[40] Peter Adamson, op. cit.
[41] DT., p. 5.
[42] DT., p. 5.
[43] Ibid. 4-6.

the world at large and whose work can be characterised as universal rather than subsumed under the restricted title of pagan, Christian or Islamic.

Furthermore, underlying Ibn Rushd's crucial insight and cultural open-mindedness is his preoccupation and excessive interest not merely in Aristotelian emphasis on "reasoning", but on how one must reason. To discipline and educate oneself in learning to use one's reason is reminiscent of Ibn Tumart's central preoccupation, namely to subvert established texts on jurisprudence and to start afresh counting on good reasoning and a direct connection with the Koran and Hadith. However, this striking similarity is limited to the supremacy given to independent thinking and reasoning. As shown earlier, when Ibn Tumart claimed to initiate his community to a purer and more rational understanding of the Qur'an he ended up creating a deeply questionable sense of education, one which disciplines and kills much more than incites individuals to learn to think for themselves and inquire the hidden meanings of the sacred text. As a self-proclaimed guide and learned last prophet, he has forcefully prevented a free use of one's reason and imposed his own manuscript to be learnt as though it were a sacred text itself. Therefore, Ibn Tumart's ostensible educative reform eventually turned into a bleak prophecy characterised by fear and complete obedience. However, as mentioned earlier, while Abd al-Mumin preserved the teachings of his master, his core interests lay mainly in firmly establishing the Almohad Empire by upgrading the level of huffaz and tullab to a more dynamic political commitment. On the other hand, a genuine openness to philosophy and its teachings came with his son, Abu Yaqub Yusuf and to a lesser degree with his grandson, Abu Yusuf Yaqub al-Mansur. As stated above, Ibn Rushd has a close and privileged relation with both caliphs and it is under the rule of Yusuf that he composed the *Descisive Treatise*. This historical fact is noteworthy because without the backing and approval of Yusuf, Ibn Rushd would not have been able to express himself freely and confidently in his Treatise. Indeed, he criticises some of al-Ghazali's books, such as, *The Incoherence of Philosophers*, on the grounds that in this text al-Ghazali paradoxically relies on a dialectical method while dealing with metaphysical questions which in fact require a demonstrative method.[44] For Ibn Rushd, such a manner of writing is a source of confusion and ambiguity for the general reader. To show his utter disapproval, Ibn Rushd went so far as to make an explicit request addressing the political leaders themselves:

> ***What is obligatory for the imams of the Muslims (aimmat al-Muslimin) is that they ban those of his books* (al-Ghazali's)** ***that contain science from all but those adept in science, just as it is obligatory upon them to ban demonstrative books from those not adept in them.***[45]

In this paragraph, the leading judge of Cordoba announces a second compelling *fatwa*; he is instructing the rulers themselves to exercise their prerogative power to monitor authors who misuse syllogistic reasoning. But in what way does Ibn Rushd expect the rulers to police the use and misuse of syllogistic reasoning? Indeed, this policing, as seen in the above quotation, must be extended to include all individuals who are 'not adept' in demonstrative reasoning. Such a demand made by a chief-jurist –philosopher and court physician- towards his caliph may sound daring and unusual. However, underpinning his stern request, Ibn Rushd knows that the sovereign ruler in question, Yusuf, is a lover and reader of wisdom (*al-hikma*). And since he is in charge of general order including the political, military, social and religious, Ibn Rushd sees it fit he similarly ensures that demonstrative manuscripts do not reach the general public. This indeed conveys Ibn Rushd's implicit attempt to count on the caliph to assist him in reinforcing the Qur'anic injunction to use one's intellect based on a necessary return to the ancient Greek philosophers: to "accept, rejoice in, and thank them for whatever agrees with the truth; and … alert to, warn against, and excuse them for whatever does not agree with the truth."[46] In the medieval period of Islam, the power of God's Word was hierarchically followed by that of the caliph's which was equally triumphant and which indirectly protected Ibn Rushd from potential harm on the part of conservative theologians. Yet, the latter's position can easily become so powerful that it can destabilize and eventually overthrow any political government. At this moment in history, though, the Almohads are at their zenith and nothing will upset their stability yet.

As seen in the above quotation, Ibn Rushd's anxiety is not merely towards al-Ghazali but similarly extends to other theologians and any individual in search of understanding and assent. He is concerned with the way in which reasoning can be learnt and taught in a specific way, i.e., in the best manner which, to his mind, is demonstrative. For the Andalusian philosopher, becoming knowledgeable of the way in which "demonstrative syllogistic reasoning differs

[44] These subjects revolve around the metaphysical questions already tackled by the peripatetic philosophers, namely al-Farabi and Ibn Sina on the eternity of the world, the nature of divine causation and the question whether God knows particularities regarding His creation. DT., pp. 13-16.
[45] DT. 22.
[46] DT. 6.

from dialectical, rhetorical, and sophistical syllogistic reasoning",[47] represents the first basic and crucial condition required of "anyone who wants to know God and all the existing things".[48] As Ivry remarks, "(i)t is the demonstrative proof, with its necessary premises, which remains the ideal form of argument for Averroes."[49] Indeed, his Aristotelian classification of reasoning[50] also encompasses an analogy he draws between this classification and people's intellectual capacities. Ibn Rushd assumes that

> **(p)eople are of three sorts with respect to the Law. One sort is in no way adept at interpretation. These are the rhetorical people, who are the overwhelming multitude … Another sort is those adept in dialectical interpretation. These are those who are dialectical by nature alone, or by nature and by habit. Another sort is those adept in certain interpretation. These are those who are demonstrative by nature and art – I mean the art of wisdom. This interpretation ought not to be declared to those adept in dialectic, not to mention the multitude.[51]**

Ibn Rushd's assumption that people's reasoning inclinations can be definitively pigeonholed as being rhetorically, dialectically, or demonstratively oriented has been criticised as "horribly elitist" by Adamson. The latter also argues that what is "(p)articuarly objectionable is his idea that the vast majority of believers should content themselves with symbolic versions of truth, without even being exposed to the dangers of more advanced philosophical discussion."[52] Similarly, Leaman points out that "the claim that unintelligent people will not be able to have the very best sort of knowledge of God might be felt to be arrogant and problematic."[53] Ironically, far from doubting his controversial classification of individuals, Ibn Rushd even claims that the Law itself supports his tripartite arrangement arguing that

> **Since what is intended by the Law is teaching true science and true practice; and teaching is of two sorts – forming a concept and bringing about assent … and there are three methods of bringing about assent for people – demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical – and two methods of forming concepts, either by means of the thing itself or by means of a likeness of it; and not all people have natures such as to accept demonstrations or dialectical arguments, let alone demonstrative arguments … and since what is intended by the Law is, indeed, to teach everyone, therefore, it is obligatory that the Law comprise all the manners of bringing about assent and all the manners of the methods of forming a concept.[54]**

According to Ibn Rushd, to do philosophy means to search for and find truth regarding interpretation of the Sacred Text.[55] In his view, the law 'teaches' conceptually, i.e., philosophically, as it is structurally split into an "apparent and an inner sense".[56] Arguably, it is this intrinsic textual frame of apparent and hidden layers which informs Ibn Rushd's whole treatise, namely the legal status of philosophy and the proper interpretation of the Law. Having established that philosophy – as well as the reading of ancient Greek texts- is compulsory, Ibn Rushd alerts to the dangers related to interpretation. Habitually, it is the theologians who interpret the Sacred text and their account is taken for granted. However, this is precisely what Ibn Rushd seeks to put into question. His elaboration of a tripartite pattern in understanding and assenting correlates with his intention to make room for all types of human dispositions. A further look at the above two quotations shows that although Ibn Rushd consistently insists on there being three intellectual levels, he also refers to the defining role given to "nature and habit" and "the art of wisdom",[57] which suggestively alludes to the possibility of there being a necessary freedom enabling one to choose their position in educating themselves and in assent. The latter, for Ibn Rushd, can be achieved by fighting against complacent habit

[47] DT. 3.
[48] DT. 3.
[49] Alfred L. Ivry, Op. cit. 53.
[50] See the works of Aristotle on logic which include, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics* in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed., Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton University Press, 1984).
[51] DT. 26.
[52] Peter Adamson, 185.
[53] Oliver Leaman, 148.
[54] DT. 24.
[55] Based on his Aristotelian reading, Ibn Rushd is adamant that « truth does not oppose truth; rather, it agrees with and bears witness to it. » DT. 9.
[56] DT. 10.
[57] See note 51.

and "poor ordering of (one's) reflection"[58] and, on the other hand, by becoming committed to a study of philosophy by a responsible "teacher"[59] who can be a reliable guide to one's intellectual growth and orientation in understanding hidden meanings.

Therefore, Ibn Rushd's legal decision that the art of wisdom (*falsafa*) ought not to be impeded and his urge for a necessary philosophical awakening subverts the prevalent rigid belief that only theologians can properly paraphrase the Sacred text. Indeed, Ibn Rushd is the first medieval scholar to have set preparatory philosophical conditions to read the Law. It can be noted that Ibn Rushd plays an important historical role in bringing to light that even belief can be thoroughly investigated and grounded in whatever type of knowing and assenting one selects for oneself. What is significant for Ibn Rushd consists in persuading his readers that speaking from the perspective of law, it is encumbant on each one to search for the truth regardless of the method they have chosen to do so. Although Ibn Rushd may be criticised for treating faith as a rational enterprise yet, as it has been argued, his fundamental preoccupation lies in attempting to distance individuals from uncritical belief and unquestioned adherence to various religious parties, since this characteristically results in confusion, mutual hatred and wars.[60] Therefore, Ibn Rushd's *Fasl al-Maqal* can be seen as an important prolegomenon to peace vis à vis the individual himself/herself and the wider community, one which transcends religious and cultural associations.

3. Conclusion

To sum up, this paper was an attempt to show that the earlier Almohad rulers were engaged in launching a cycle of learning and memorising the Qur'an as well as Ibn Tumart's manuscripts. This cycle, unfortunately, was nevertheless entangled in a structure of ideological and political power, one which deliberately incapacitated disciples' potential to acquire a new knowledge based on genuine teaching rather than on dissemblance and punishment. On the other hand, Ibn Rushd's *Decisive Treatise* was arguably a means to try to mend Ibn Tumart's failed promise to introduce reasoning in parallel with theology and jurisprudence. Central to his endeavour was the importance he perceives in dividing reasoning and assenting into three intellectual capacities: each capacity pushes the individual either to accept their position as being limited and to act accordingly, or, with the assistance of a responsible teacher and guide, question their habitual way of thinking and strive to learn critical reading and understanding. In fact, Ibn Rushd encourages educating oneself by making errors. He devotes many pages on "error" and analyses it insisting that there are fundamental and accidental errors upon which all types of learning are built. What is required, he stresses, is to distinguish between the two and not to idly confuse them. To Ibn Rushd, making errors does not condemn philosophical undertaking, since without taking the time to grasp this ancient Greek discipline the hidden meaning in the Koran, in the world and in being in general will remain eclipsed under dogmatic and superficial interpretations of theological scholars.[61]

References

Abun-Nasr, J. M., *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Adamson, Peter, *Philosophy in the Islamic World*, vol. 3 (Oxford University Press, 2016).

Arnaldez, Roger, *Averroès, un rationaliste en Islam* (Editions Balland, 1998).

Averroes, Decisive Treatise & Epistle Dedicatory, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Brigham Young University Press, 2001).

Averroès, Le Livre du discours décisif, trans. Marc Geoffroy, introduction Alain de Libera (Flammarion, Paris, 1996).

Barnes, Jonathan (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 2 vols. (Princeton University Press, 1984).

Benmakhlouf, Ali, *Averroès* (Perrin, les Belles Lettres, 2009).

[58] DT. 7.

[59] For Ibn Rushd, studying philosophy requires time and a competent teacher. However, the latter is not immune from making errors which at times can lead the learner astray. In Ibn Rushd's view, such errors may be vicious yet they are merely accidental and not essential. In other words, if they do happen this should not cause the ban of philosophy nor should they restrain individuals from seeking a deeper and more challenging understanding of the world and the Sacred Text. On Ibn Rushd's account of « error », See pp. 7-22.

[60] DT. 30.

[61] After his death, Ibn Rushd's philosophy thrived in the Latin West rather than in the Muslim world and hugely influenced philosophers in Europe, mainly in Paris and Padua.

Benmakhlouf, Ali, *Pourquoi lire les philosophes Arabes* (Albin Michel, 2015).

Bennison, Amira, K., *The Great Caliphs: The Golden Age of the 'Abbasid Empire* (I. B. Tauris, 2011).

Brett, M. and Fentress, E., *The Berbers* (Blackwell, London, 1998).

Copleston, F. C., *A History of Medieval Philosophy* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1990).

Esposito, J. L., (ed. In chief), *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam* (Oxford University Press, 2003).

Fakhry, Majid, *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (Columbia University Press, 2004).

Fakhry, Majid, *A Short Introduction to Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism* (Oxford, 1997).

Fletcher, Richard, *Moorish Spain* (University of California Press, 1992).

Fromherz, A. J., *The Almohads: The Rise of an Islamic Empire* (I. B. Tauris, 2013).

Glick, Thomas, F., *From Muslim Fortress to Christian Castle: Social and Cultural Change in Medieval Spain* (Manchester University Press, UK., 1995).

Guichard, Pierre, *Al-Andalus: 711-1492 Une histoire de l'Espagne musulmane* (Pluriel, Paris, 2001).

Kamali, M. H., *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence* (Islamic Texts Society, 1997).

Kennedy, Hugh, *The Caliphate* (Pelican Books, 2016).

Leaman, Oliver, *A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy* (Polity Press, UK., 1999).

Leaman, Oliver, *Averroes and His Philosophy* (Curzon Press, UK., 1998).

Lévi-Provençal, E., *L'Espagne musulmane au Xeme siècle: Institution et vie sociale* (Larose-Paris, 1996).

Luscombe, Savid, *Medieval Thought* (Oxford University Press, 1997).

Messier, Ronald, A., *The Almoravids and the Meanings of Jihad* (Praeger, California, 2010).

Nasr. S. H and Leaman, Oliver (eds.), *History of Islamic Philosophy*, Part I (London, 1996).

Rodinson, Maxime, *Muhammad: Prophet of Islam* (Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2002).

Urvoy, Dominique, *Averroes, les ambitions d'un intellectual musulman* (Flammarion, 1998).

Watt, Montgomery. W. and Cachia, Pierre, *A History of Islamic Spain* (Edinburgh University Press, 1996).

Watt, Montgomery. W., *Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (University Press, Edinburgh, 1997).