Abstract
In the field of patent law, the concept of "inventor" faces real challenges in the era of artificial intelligence, as exemplified by the DABUS case. Judicial decisions and reasoning in relevant cases in major countries demonstrate the adaptability of the concept of "inventor" within the framework of anthropocentric legislation. This concept is closely related to the question of artificial intelligence subjectivity in philosophy, reflecting the historical legacy of subjectivity philosophy and its contemporary dilemma. From the perspectives of functionalism and post-humanism, we should break through the traditional concept of inventorship and construct a patent law system adapted to artificial intelligence innovation, achieving a dynamic balance between incentivizing innovation and protecting the public interest. This provides theoretical references and practical solutions for resolving the patent protection dilemma of artificial intelligence inventions.
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How to cite this paper
Breaking the Boundary of the Concept of Inventor in Patent Law in the Age of Artificial Intelligence——The Limitations of Anthropocentric Legislation: A Look at the DABUS Case
How to cite this paper: Henry Zhiheng Zhou. (2025) Breaking the Boundary of the Concept of Inventor in Patent Law in the Age of Artificial Intelligence——The Limitations of Anthropocentric Legislation: A Look at the DABUS Case. Future Trends in AI Research, 2(1), 6-11.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.26855/ftair.2025.06.002