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ArticleOpen Access http://dx.doi.org/10.26855/ept.2025.06.001

Government Subsidies and Consumer Preferences in Dual-channel Green Supply Chains

Michelle Jinrong Dai

Shanghai American School Puxi, Shanghai 200000, China.

*Corresponding author: Michelle Jinrong Dai

Published: August 8,2025

Abstract

This study examines the interrelationships among pricing strategies, consumer green preferences, channel preferences, and government subsidy policies in a green dual-channel supply chain (DCGSC). The study analyzes the profit differences between supply chains under centralized and decentralized decision-making models and investigates in depth the impact of government subsidies on green product production and pricing strategies. The experimental results show that government subsidies play an important role in reducing the production costs of green products and increasing market demand, especially when green products can enter the market at lower prices through government subsidies to satisfy consumers' green preferences. Consumers' green product preferences and channel preferences significantly affect pricing strategies. The centralized decision-making model is able to coordinate the interests of manufacturers and retailers to maximize the overall profit of the supply chain, while the decentralized decision-making model leads to a decrease in the overall profit due to a lack of coordination.

Keywords

Green supply chain; Dual-channel supply chain; Government subsidies

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How to cite this paper

Government Subsidies and Consumer Preferences in Dual-channel Green Supply Chains

How to cite this paper: Michelle Jinrong Dai. (2025) Government Subsidies and Consumer Preferences in Dual-channel Green Supply Chains. Economic Perspectives and Trends2(1), 1-9.

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.26855/ept.2025.06.001